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Does Contemporary Art Have Cognitive Value?
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In his book Art and Knowledge, James O. Young suggests that avant-garde art,
because it tends to eschew the resources of illustrative representation, lacks
cognitive value.  Because he regards cognitive value as a necessary condition for a
high degree of aesthetic value, he concludes that avant-garde works tend to have
little aesthetic value and thus do not deserve to be regarded as valuable artworks
(or, in many cases, as artworks at all). 
In this paper, I will mount a defence of avant-garde art against Young’s criticisms.  I
will examine particular artworks to show that the use of exemplification in many
avant-garde works is sufficient to allow them to make the kind of cognitive
contribution Young requires.  And I will show that even an avant-garde work that
uses virtually none of the resources of illustrative representation makes available an
experience that is a valuable source of knowledge.  There is, thus, nothing about
avant-garde art that prevents it from having, or makes it especially unlikely to have,
cognitive value. 
A point of clarification is in order.  The title of my paper refers to contemporary art,
whereas Young speaks of avant-garde art, so it might appear that we are concerned
with different subject matters.  But Young clearly does intend his critique to apply
to much contemporary work, as he claims that “…the avant-garde is currently the
dominant academic style” in the visual arts (139).  My commitment to the value of
contemporary art plays a large role in motivating what follows. 
Art has a distinctive way of contributing to knowledge, in Young’s view.  Artworks,
unlike, say, scientific theories, provide us with perspectives on their objects, and
these perspectives make new insights available.  For example:
Monet’s paintings of the cathedral (in Rouen) … can add something to an
audience’s conception of the cathedral.  Audience members can learn that the
appearance of the cathedral varies greatly with time of day and atmospheric
conditions, and that its emotional impact on viewers can be enormously
various. (81-2) 
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To have cognitive value, an artwork must not only make new insights available, but
also supply us with justification for those insights: after all, knowledge requires
justification.  An artwork supplies such justification, in Young’s view, by putting us
in a position to recognize the appropriateness of the perspective it presents.
On this understanding of what constitutes value for artworks, Young tells us,
“[s]omething has gone dreadfully wrong in modern art” (134).  Specifically, avant-
garde artworks, by virtue of their distinctive features, eschew the very resources
that make it possible for artworks to contribute to knowledge.  The avant-garde
style, as Young defines it, comprises all works possessing two features: First,
“avant-garde works of art are always new and unlike … all previously produced
artworks, except a small set of roughly contemporaneous avant-garde works”
(137).  Second, and most importantly, “avant-garde art … forsakes all or many of
the resources of illustrative representation….  [T]he only form of illustration
employed by many avant-garde works,” Young tells us, “is exemplification” (138).
Why is illustrative representation so crucial?  Illustrative representation, by
providing us with an experience that resembles in certain ways the experience of
the represented object, can present and demonstrate the correctness of a perspective
on the represented object.  In Young’s view, the failure to employ illustrative
representation deprives avant-garde works of the capacity to present a perspective
on an object, for “art must represent the aspects of the world into which it provides
insight” (23).  And if avant-garde works cannot present perspectives on objects,
they cannot contribute ina significant way to knowledge.
I will not here take up the question of whether we should accept Young’s
requirement that an artwork, to be worthy of the name, must contribute to
knowledge in the way he describes.  Instead, I will ask, are avant-garde works in
fact incapable of presenting and demonstrating the appropriateness of a perspective
on reality, as Young charges?  To answer this question, we must first have a clearer
idea of what Young’s avant-garde category consists of.  We can then see how the
category may be extended to encompass many contemporary artworks, and assess
whether these works, as a class, are somehow precluded from having cognitive
value.
Avant-garde works are, by Young’s definition, those that do not employ the full
resources of illustrative representation.  But this is not to say that they employ no
such resources.  Some of Young’s avant-garde artists are abstract painters, including
Wassily Kandinsky, Piet Mondrian, Barnett Newman and Mark Rothko.  While
these artists’ mature works do not contain likenesses of real objects that exist in the
world, to say they are completely void of representational content or intent would
be incorrect.  Kandinsky’s works appear to present forms in space; as he said at the
opening of a 1914 exhibition of his work, “objects did not want to, and were not to,
disappear altogether from my pictures….  [O]bjects, in themselves, have a
particular spiritual sound….” Rothko’s works are readily seen as alluding to
emotional and spiritual states (just as abstract musical works may do, in Young’s
view).  And Mondrian and Newman sometimes use titles (Broadway Boogie
Woogie, The Stations of the Cross) to associate their images with concrete subject
matters.   
Others among the avant-garde artists picked out by Young use illustrative
representation quite explicitly.  Young discusses René Magritte’s painting La
Trahison des images, in which an illustration of a pipe is juxtaposed with the
statement, “Ceci n’est pas une pipe.”  He also includes in his roster Jeff Koons, who
is well known for oversized kitsch figurines such as Michael Jackson and Bubbles
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and St. John the Baptist, and Claes Oldenburg, whose œuvre includes many
everyday objects sculpturally rendered in soft, droopy material (as in Soft Pay-
Telephone and Floor Burger).  The inclusion of Oldenburg is somewhat surprising,
since his sculptural works, which toy extensively with solidity, materiality and
scale, seem quite rich in possibilities for presenting perspectives on the objects
they depict, and on the world in which such objects are everywhere to be found.
A further grouping of Young’s avant-garde artists consists of those who employ not
(or not only) representation, but the direct “sampling” of imagery, objects, materials
or phenomena from non-art contexts.  Marcel Duchamp, with his ready-mades, is
an obvious example.  Andy Warhol was a notorious appropriator of imagery who
created plywood boxes screen printed with the same words and patterns as those
found on Brillo soap pad boxes, made a sculpture of actual cans of Campbell’s
Soup, and produced a series of silkscreens from a newspaper photograph of an
electric chair.  He also sampled from other artworks, such as Leonardo da Vinci’s
Last Supper.  The composer John Cage samples from reality in 4'33", during which
the musicians are silent and the audience hears only incidental ambient sounds, and
again in Imaginary Landscape No. 4, in which the  performers scan up and down
the dials of 12 radios, producing a soundscape dependent on what the local radio
stations happen to be playing at the time.  We might also see Chris Burden’s work
Shoot, for which he had a friend shoot him in the arm, as falling into this category
insofar as it samples a real-life phenomenon. 
This kind of sampling of imagery, materials and phenomena from non-art contexts
—which, I take it, centrally involves ‘exemplification’, one of the resources of
illustrative representation identified by Young—remains very common within
contemporary art.  As I understand him, then, Young includes under the avant-garde
heading those works that employ sampling.  And if this is true, then a strong case
can be made for his claim that the avant-garde remains the dominant academic
tendency within contemporary art.  Contemporary artists often attempt to eliminate
the mediating (or distorting) forces of their own interpretations by simply importing
objects, phenomena and materials from the non-art realm, or (when that is not
possible or does not serve the artist’s purpose) by creating casts of objects, or
videos or photographs, as opposed to traditional drawings, sculptures or paintings.
I take it, then, that the following works would count as contemporary examples of
the avant-garde tendency:
Damien Hirst’s Mother and Child Divided and Away from the Flock, in which he
uses the bodies of animals.
Rachel Whiteread’s House, Untitled (Torso) and related works, in which she
samples by creating casts of what are referred to in art as negative spaces, such as a
building interior and the inside of a water bottle.
Janet Cardiff’s Forty-Part Motet, in which the artist presents an installation of 40
speakers, mounted at head-level and arranged in an oval.  Cardiff employed 40
microphones, each attached to an individual singer, to record a stunning
performance of Thomas Tallis’s Spem in Alium, a motet for forty voices.  The
audience member can circulate among the speakers to listen to individual voices
and hear the piece from any of a variety of positions.  The audience also hears the
singers in between performances as they cough, mumble and chat amongst
themselves.  Cardiff thus makes available to audience members an experience of
the piece that would be unavailable even during a live performance, given the social
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prohibitions on such behaviours as placing one’s ear right next to the singer’s
mouth.
Now that we have a grasp of the avant-garde category as Young construes it, we are
in a position to evaluate his claim that avant-garde works tend to lack value because
they fail to contribute to knowledge.  To this end, I will present two extended
examples of contemporary artworks that employ sampling, or the appropriation of
objects and materials from non-art contexts.  In each case, as I will show, the use of
sampling enables the artist to present a perspective that supplies valuable insights
into an important subject matter.  Moreover, these works have as great a claim as
many valuable non-avant-garde works to success at demonstrating the
appropriateness of the perspectives they present.
Annie Thibault, a contemporary artist from Gatineau, Quebec, uses the methods
and materials of science to produce her artworks.  For her 1999 work
LABORATOIRE: sous l’antre de la chambre stérile (LABORATORY: In the shelter
of the sterile chamber), Thibault experimented with fungus cultures, then created an
installation in which she attached to the gallery walls a large number of Petri dishes

















mostly reds, but with occasional accents of yellow and orange—developed over
time as the exhibition progressed.  The pattern in which the Petri dishes were
installed was abstract: the work was not simply a drawing using unconventional
materials (though the pattern might certainly be seen to allude to certain organic
phenomena, such as the spread of roots underground, or a network of blood
vessels).  The work exemplifies certain natural-cum-scientific phenomena by
sampling materials directly from natural and scientific contexts.
There are, unquestionably, some things we learn from seeing Thibault’s work.  We
learn about the development over time of the fungi she works with.  In fact, if we
stay with the work over time, we can learn a great deal about this subject: the work
provides testimony to the multiplication of cells, the gradual infusion of colour, the
variability of development under different conditions, and so forth.  But Young
might well want to suggest that all of these are things better revealed by science. 
After all, science is well-suited to discovering facts about fungi.  And scientists can
publish journal articles, textbooks and specialized monographs that are well-suited
to conveying these new discoveries to an audience either of specialists or of
generalists. 


















of a scientist, and she signals this explicitly by affixing most of the Petri dishes to
the wall vertically, rather than displaying them on shelves or tables.  The
arrangement of the Petri dishes on the walls is unruly rather than regular and
organized (in the manner we would expect from a scientific presentation): there
certainly is no obvious taxonomic principle of organization.  And indeed, the
intricacies of the phenomena observed seem unlikely to be fully captured or
respected by the overarching principles sought by scientific inquiry.  Thibault’s
work thus presents a perspective on the adequacy of scientific methods for
understanding and appreciating such phenomena.
Thibault’s work diverges from the methods of science in another respect, as well. 
Scientists are not in the business of putting on displays, and this in itself suggests
that Thibault’s project is extra-scientific.  But suppose that we compare her work to
a similar display that might, conceivably, be found in a science or nature museum,
if a set of Petri dishes filled with fungus cultures were exhibited for a period of
weeks so that the public could view them and experience, close up, at leisure and in
detail, the developments within.  The fact that Thibault presents her work in the
context of artistic displays, rather than in a museum of science, alters the kind of
experience the viewer is likely to have and thus makes possible a very different
kind of contribution to knowledge.  By presenting the work in a gallery space, she
secures a certain kind of attention from an audience whose aesthetic expectations
and sensibilities are activated. These expectations and sensibilities involve an
openness
to
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specifically aesthetic wonderment and delight, a propensity to see the work as
situated within an art historical context and as the product of the artist’s intentional
activity, and a willingness, on this basis, to consider its broader signification—as
metaphor, allusion and so forth.  By sampling from natural phenomena in an artistic
context, Thibault presents a perspective on the natural world, one that reveals the
appropriateness of wonderment in response to that world (as opposed to simply
provoking such wonderment, as
many kinds of non-artistic
experience, such as viewing a
display in the museum of science,
might do).  And it does so with an
outstanding perceptual richness,
imprinting on the senses an
awareness of minute details and
magnificent patterns that are not
adequately conveyed by
descriptions or photographs of the
same phenomena (or, for that
matter, by digital images).
This strikes me as closely parallel
to certain claims Young makes in
relation to music.  “[M]any of
Mozart’s musical compositions,”
he tells us,
present a perspective on
pleasure.  In listening to these
works one feels something like
pure, invigorating delight.  As
such the music can be an
introspective affective
illustration of such an affect, and also provides a perspective on it.  On this
perspective, pure delight is to be thought of as something to be relished.  When
pleasure is viewed in this way, it is not trivial or something about which one
ought to feel guilty.  It is somehow essential to being human. (81)
If Mozart can do all of this—not only provoke pleasure, but also, and thereby,
convey the appropriateness of that very pleasure—completely in the absence of
argument or semantic or pictorial representation, then I am hard pressed to see why
Thibault’s work should not be seen as presenting, and demonstrating the
appropriateness of, a perspective on the natural world and our experience of it. 
Let us now turn to another work, one created by the Canadian artist Liz Magor in
1976.  It consists of a bookcase, the shelves of which have been stocked with jars of
fruit and vegetable preserves and a box of recipes.  To grasp the nature of this work,
you might need to know some or all of the following facts.  Its title is Time and
Mrs. Tiber, which suggests that it is somehow about the relationship of a particular
person, here identified by name, to time.  Mrs. Tiber was a real person who, in fact,
made most of the jars of preserves included in the work.  The artist, who found the
preserves in an abandoned cottage after Mrs. Tiber’s death, made a few more jars of
preserves to supplement them.  The preserves are gradually disintegrating.  In her
discussions with curators at the National Gallery of Canada, which owns Time and
Mrs. Tiber, the artist at one point suggested that it should be allowed to deteriorate,
and that when it is no longer exhibitable it should be thrown in the garbage. 
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Once you know some or all of these facts, certain interpretative possibilities
become salient.  The work deals in issues related to decay and to our attempts to
preserve ourselves and other things against the injurious effects of time.  The title
suggests a close relation between the objects and Mrs. Tiber, making manifest her
attempts to preserve the fruits of her labour and showing the ultimate and necessary
failure of these attempts.  Her body has already broken down, and her material
legacy, though surviving her temporarily, is fading before our eyes.  The work is, I
think, quite plausibly seen as presenting a perspective on death, and how we live in
the face of it.  Moreover, the work makes this perspective available in a way that is
especially poignant: the objects themselves, which are the products of the labour of
the artist and Mrs. Tiber, are visibly disintegrating.  Whereas we tend to associate
art objects with immortality and make heroic efforts to preserve them, the artist is
willing to accept that all evidence of her creative contribution will eventually be
swallowed into the void.
Is this work discourse-dependent, a failing that Young identifies in many avant-
garde works?  Notice that the availability of the perspective presented by the work
is in no way dependent on a sophisticated knowledge of art, avant-garde or
otherwise.  An understanding of the work also requires much less, in the way of
background knowledge, than is required by many works of, say, Renaissance art: it
does not presuppose knowledge of certain literary narratives, historical figures or
events, or reigning discourses of Western culture.  And there is nothing particularly
obscure about the facts that help us understand the work: a simple wall panel could
provide all of the information I’ve offered, and more.  (And viewers might be able
to get quite far, interpretatively, with just the title and careful observation, which
would allow them to detect the disintegrated state of the preserves.)  Because
audiences are, in Young’s words, “able to acquire the knowledge … necessary for
the interpretation of [the] work” (129), there is no inherent barrier to its
interpretability. 
I take these cases to show that exemplification provides much richer possibilities, in
terms of the presentation of perspectives, than Young acknowledges in his
discussion of avant-garde art.  The fact that a work exemplifies, say, decay, rather
than illustrating it by means of a sign that is conventionally associated with decay,
is no barrier to the work’s ability to present a perspective on decay and also on
death, which the idea of decay calls readily to mind.  Indeed, the use of
exemplification seems, potentially, to eliminate the need for the sort of pre-existing
conventions of representation that make possible the presentation of perspectives by
non-avant-garde artworks.  And if this is true—if it is true that the use of sampling
can in some cases direct an audience to a subject matter even in the absence of
established conventions of representation—this seems likely to facilitate, or perhaps
constitute, new modes of expression, which Young values highly.  Indeed, he tells
us, “When artists develop new modes of expression they make possible the thinking
of new thoughts” (133). 
It is conceivable that Young would concede that the works I have discussed do have
cognitive value, but would suggest that the extensive sampling the works employ
actually places them outside his ‘avant-garde’ category.  If this is true, then it seems
that many of the works he cites as specific instances of the avant-garde would have
to be removed from the category.  Another consequence would be that his claim
about the avant-garde being the dominant academic tendency in contemporary art
would come out false: for there are relatively few contemporary works that deal
solely in, say, geometric minimalism or pure abstraction or semantic representation.
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But suppose we were to restrict the avant-garde category to abstract and minimalist
works.  Would it be true, even then, that such works fail to contribute to
knowledge?  Consider a work that is surely an example of the avant-garde par
excellence.  Fred Sandback’s Untitled (one of four diagonals) (1970) is a length of
black elastic cord that extends from the intersection of two walls and the floor, in
one corner of the gallery space, to the intersection of the other two walls and the
ceiling, in the opposite corner.  The cord is narrow and taut, so what the viewer sees
is a sharp, straight, black line running the full diagonal extent of the room. 
This work does not employ sampling, as many contemporary works do.  It is
extremely sparing in its use of illustrative representation.  In a 1974 review in
Artforum, the eminent critic Lawrence Alloway derided a group of similar
Sandback works for their “lack of a sufficiently intricate stimulus” (“Reviews,”
Artforum, May 1974).  Now I do not mean to defend Sandback as the unrecognized
true master of the modernist movement.  But I do think that Alloway’s response
fails to take account of the way in which Sandback’s work makes available a certain
kind of experience.  The very fact that viewers enter the gallery in search of an
intricate stimulus, and fail to find it in the object Sandback presents, prompts a
redirection of special perceptual attunement toward the context which houses both
the work and the viewer.  If I give in to the experience of the piece, I can detect
responses within myself.  I find that, although the string occupies only a tiny
fraction of the space in the room and I could easily walk under it without risk of
touching it, I feel forbidden to enter.  Untitled claims the entire room and stakes out
a psychological claim on the viewer or, at least, on me, driving my behaviour
through a changed perception of the space.  If I attend to the black cord’s effect on
me, I make a new discovery about myself in a certain type of relation to space and
objects.  I might also find that, faced with an object that is small enough to fit in my
pocket and that can, nonetheless, decisively occupy an entire room, my body feels
both cumbersome and insubstantial.  And as my awareness of my own physicality
is interwoven with my awareness of the work, a black cord completely lacking in
illustrational significance begins to evoke a precarious tightrope passage, exhibiting
the “theatrical” quality that the critic Michael Fried detected in minimalist works
(“Art and Objecthood,” Artforum, June 1967).
Now does this work present, and demonstrate the appropriateness of, a perspective
on something that will eventuate in a particular set of identifiable insights that are
likely to be shared by all, or most, viewers?  I assume that Young would claim that
it does not, and I am willing to accept this suggestion (though, of course, if we are
interested in facts about audience response, empirical investigation is required). 
Young is concerned that avant-garde works fail to contribute to knowledge because
different viewers report very different experiences of them, with the consequence
that the works are uninterpretable.  But I don’t think we should accept the
requirement that audience response be homogeneous.
In his discussion of what makes for cognitive value, Young notes that artworks are
especially well suited to providing knowledge of certain subjects: in particular,
“ourselves, our emotions, our relations to each other and our place in the world”
(97).  An artwork which makes available to us a certain kind of encounter places us
in a position to gain precisely this kind of knowledge: knowledge about ourselves,
our emotions (and our inner lives more generally), our places in the world, our
relation to other entities in the world, and so forth.  It is hardly surprising that you
and I may have different experiences within such a scenario: for we are different
people, and it is fully appropriate that I may learn different things about myself than
you learn about yourself.  One thing I may learn is simply that a certain kind of
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experience is possible for me, or that I am the kind of person who has a certain type
of experience within a certain situation.  And this seems to find a ready parallel in
Young’s suggestion that an artwork may contribute to knowledge “simply [by]
present[ing] the perspective that some emotion is possible” (81)
Sandback’s work certainly does not deal in universals about human experience.  It
does not convey a body of justified insights that every adequately prepared viewer
will apprehend.  But then, as Young acknowledges, artworks are not suited to
demonstrating universal truths in any case.  The arts, he says, “will be most able to
provide insight into complex, diverse subjects where general laws are elusive or
non-existent” (97).  For “[a]n artwork … frequently provides a perspective on only
a single object.  At most, it presents a perspective on a very specific type of
object….  Each sonnet, each sonata, each drawing sheds light on a small corner of
reality” (97).  And this leads to the conclusion that “[w]hile a few scientific theories
will suffice, we need a great deal of art” (97). 
There are many things to learn about the world and about ourselves, and the
methods sufficient to our explorations will surely be quite variegated. 
Contemporary art, while it often shies away from illustration, makes extensive use
of tools such as appropriation and contextualization that allow it to probe deeply
into a wide variety of topics, including those most central to our understanding of
the human condition.  There is no reason to think that avant-garde artworks are
handicapped with respect to their ability to contribute to knowledge.  If we wish to
undertake a fully nuanced investigation of the important subject matters Young has
identified, we need not only illustrative representation, but also works that employ
the alternative, but no less fertile, resources of avant-garde art.
All images © 1999 Annie Thibault.  Used with the permission of the artist.
Photographer: Ivan Binet
Previous article / 
Article précédent Top / Début
Table of content / Table des
matières
Next article /
Article suivant
